The network port or interface from which the activity originated (for example, attacker or client).
Data Type
String
Aliases
|
Use |
Alias |
|---|---|
|
Client Console Full Name |
Interface (Origin) |
|
Client Console Short Name |
Not applicable |
|
Web Console Tab/Name |
Interface (Origin) |
|
Elasticsearch Field Name |
originInterface |
|
Rule Builder Column Name |
sinterface |
|
Regex Pattern |
<sinterface> |
|
NetMon Name |
Not applicable |
Field Relationships
- SIP
- SIPv4
- SIPv6
- SIPv6E
- Origin Hostname
- Origin Hostname or IP
- Origin NAT IP
- DIP
- DIPv4
- DIPv6
- DIPv6E
- Impacted Hostname
- Impacted Hostname or IP
- Impacted NAT IP
- Origin Port
- Origin NAT Port
- Impacted Port
- Impacted NAT Port
- Origin MAC Address
- Impacted MAC Address
- Impacted Interface
- Origin Domain
- Impacted Domain
- Origin Login
- Impacted Account
- IANA Protocol Number
- IANA Protocol Name
Common Applications
-
Switches
-
Firewalls
-
Network equipment
Use Case
Troubleshooting connectivity.
MPE/Data Masking Manipulations
Not applicable.
Usage Standards
-
Origin is Client (In Client-Server Model).
-
Origin is Attacker (In Attacker-Target Model).
-
If you have more than just a port number (for example, a switch ID), capture full interface name including switch ID.
-
A Wireless Access Point can be an interface.
Examples
-
FortiGate
02 25 2010 13:56:25 1.1.1.1 <LOC5:ALRT> date=2010-02-25 time=13:56:25 devname=FG322222222222222 device_id=FG2222222222 log_id=0419016384 type=ips subtype=signature pri=alert fwver=040003 severity=critical carrier_ep="N/A" profile="scan" src=1.1.1.1 dst=1.1.1.1 src_int="port1" dst_int="port2" policyid=48 serial=23455436 status=detected proto=6 service=2612/tcp vd="root" count=1 src_port=80 dst_port=2612 attack_id=107347979 sensor="all_default" ref="http://Host1/ids/VID107347979" user="N/A" group="N/A" incident_serialno=128862663 msg="http_decoder: HTTP.Request.Smuggling"
Firewall log showing a signature detection with interface src (origin). In this case, the possible attacker (origin) is represented as source from the Firewall perspective.
-
Squid Proxy
2014/05/01 10:45:29| Accepting spoofing HTTP connections at 1.1.1.1:3128, FD 14.
Connection origin showing IP and corresponding interface.
-
Juniper Firewall
08 23 2016 09:56:43 1.1.1.1 <USER:INFO> 1 2016-08-23T14:56:42.429Z USABLDRRECFLOW01 RT_FLOW - RT_FLOW_SESSION_CREATE [junos@1.1.1.1.2.40 source-address="1.1.1.1" source-port="57101" destination-address="1.1.1.1" destination-port="443" service-name="junos-https" nat-source-address="1.1.1.1" nat-source-port="57101" nat-destination-address="1.1.1.1" nat-destination-port="443" src-nat-rule-type="static rule" src-nat-rule-name="ARUBA_RAP_WLC3600_xlate" dst-nat-rule-type="N/A" dst-nat-rule-name="N/A" protocol-id="6" policy-name="EMEA_ARUBA_GUEST_ACCESS" source-zone-name="FRONTEND_DMZ" destination-zone-name="INTERNET" session-id-32="83048" username="N/A" roles="N/A" packet-incoming-interface="reth5.0" application="UNKNOWN" nested-application="UNKNOWN" encrypted="UNKNOWN"]
Showing inbound interface in flow.
-
Cisco Router
10 09 2016 01:59:26 1.1.1.1 <LOC7:ERRR> Original Address=1.1.1.1 39296: Oct 9 01:59:48: %ILPOWER-3-CONTROLLER_PORT_ERR: Controller port error, Interface Gi4/0/38: Power Controller reports Short detected
Parse full interface Gi4/0/38.